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The traditional understanding of state sovereignty as 
the indivisible and unified locus of state power that 
legitimises the rule of law over a state’s territory is an 
unattainable ideal (Agnew, 2005; Butler, 2004; 
Erlenbusch, 2012). State sovereignty is not only chal-
lenged from the outside, i.e. from other states. Actors 
like guerrillas, mafias, criminals, or strongmen pose 
challenges to the state’s domestic sovereignty, too 
(Axtmann, 2004; Krasner, 1999; Stepputat, 2013). 
These “informal sovereignties” (Hansen & Stepputat, 
2006, p. 295) exercise control over spaces and their 
populations while seemingly acting outside the legal 
domains of state law. Also, movements for sub-
national autonomy challenge the state’s authority over 
its territories by claiming an “own” space or “home-
land”. They not only propose alternative visions of 
which areas and populations belong together (Werlen, 
2005); their mass protests (violent or peaceful) also 
signify a lack of compliance with governmental rules 
and directives. As the ideal of indivisible sovereignty 
over territory remains a central aim of the state, the 
control of such perceivably “unruly” spaces (Karlsson 
2011; Li 2001; Stepputat 2013) and their “dangerous” 
populations is of utmost importance for governments. 
Drawing on my case study of the movement for a new 
Union State “Gorkhaland” in India, I explore how the 
West Bengal government tries to maintain the territo-
rial integrity of its polity and to reinstate its sovereign 
monopoly over the contested region. I explicitly focus 
on the role of local strongmen as informal sovereigns, 
and the government’s attempts to control these by 
transforming them into state-dependent “petty sover-
eigns” (Butler 2004). By dismantling the relations 
between these strongmen and the state, my case un-
derlines that boundaries between formal and informal 
sovereignties are not clear-cut. Rather, the state cre-
ates and controls the conditions for local strongmen to 
ascertain their own privileged position in local poli-
tics. Only in a relationship of co-dependence can both, 
the state and the insurgent leaders maintain their 
authority. This paper is based on qualitative inter-
views with political leaders, tea plantation workers 
and intellectuals in Darjeeling district as well as on 
observations of political meetings and a review of 
newspaper articles (mainly from The Telegraph). Field 
research was conducted in Darjeeling between Janu-
ary 2011 and July 2013. 
 
Darjeeling as an unruly space  
In 2007, Darjeeling district - situated in the foothills of 
the Himalayas - witnessed the revival of a movement 
for a new Union State of “Gorkhaland”. The “Gorkhas” 
–the Nepali-speaking majority of the region– demand-
ed a territory comprising both Darjeeling district and 
its adjoining areas in Northern West Bengal. Enticed 
by the British colonial rulers, the ancestors of many 
Gorkhas had migrated to Darjeeling from today’s Ne-
pal during the colonial time to work on the newly es-
tablished tea plantations or to join the army. Despite 
being Indian citizens, many Gorkhas feel stigmatised 
as citizens from Nepal and claim that only Gorkhaland 
could guarantee them a recognised “Indian” identity. 
Their feeling of governmental neglect is supported by 
perceptions of being culturally and racially different 
from the Bengal-dominated plains (Middleton 2013; 
Wenner 2016). Earlier, in the 1980s, when the previ-
ously ruling Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) 
had initiated a violent movement for Gorkhaland, the 
then Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M) led 
State government had reacted with the deployment of 
paramilitary forces. More than 1,200 persons died in 
the civil war like agitation which resulted in the crea-
tion of an autonomous sub-State Darjeeling Gorkha 
Hill Council (DGHC) in 1988 (Samanta, 2000; Subba, 
1992). Various accounts underline how the DGHC, 
instead of fostering development, succumbed to an 
instrument of power in the hands of the GNLF which 
ruled it for the coming 20 years, passively accepted by 
the West Bengal government (Chakrabarty, 2005; 
Lacina, 2009; Sarkar & Bhaumik, 2000). Eventually, in 
October 2007 the newly established Gorkha Janmukti 
Morcha (Gorkha Liberation Front, GJM) succeeded the 
GNLF while announcing a “democratic and non-
violent” movement for Gorkhaland. While both na-
tional and State government are opposed to the claim, 
the protest is mostly directed against the West Bengal 
government. Various indefinite general strikes 
(bandhs), gheraos (encircling by a human chain) of 
government offices and police stations, tax-boycotts, 
and hunger strikes in Darjeeling posed stark challeng-
es to the State governments’ authority and its ability to 
enforce “law and order” in the contested region. The 
Gorkhas’ historical demand for Gorkhaland renders 
the Darjeeling hills an unruly space with a “dangerous” 
population carrying high potential for forceful and 
sustained agitations. This “dangerousness” is en-
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hanced by commonly held perceptions of the “wild 
hills”, and by the fact that Darjeeling is situated in a 
geostrategically sensitive border region between Ne-
pal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and China. I now sketch two 
examples that underline how GJM leaders can be con-
sidered as informal sovereigns in their own right. 
Thereafter, I show how the government brought these 
leaders under its control by creating (and contracting) 
exceptional conditions for them to rule. 
The GJM as an informal sovereign 
Carl Schmitt (1985) saw sovereignty manifested in the 
decision of the sovereign (i.e. government, king) to 
suspend the law, and creation of a temporally and 
spatially circumscribed “state of exception” 
(Erlenbusch, 2012; Korf & Schetter, 2012). Agamben 
(1998, 2005) transcended this understanding by em-
phasising that this state of exception is not a tempo-
rary and spatially limited event but an intrinsic and 
permanent element of governance (Hagmann & Korf, 
2012). Similarly, Butler (2004) detected sovereign 
power as a tactic in the field of governance, a point I 
return to below. Agamben’s (1998) emphasis on “bare 
life” as the body on which sovereign power is in-
scribed (in distinction to the political life of recognised 
and right-endowed citizens), inspired Hansen and 
Stepputat to approach sovereignty as the de facto 
power “to kill, punish, and discipline with impunity” 
(Hansen & Stepputat, 2006, p. 13). Such conceptualisa-
tions help accounting for the manifold forms of infor-
mal sovereign power as described above and to identi-
fy sovereign acts of the GJM leaders and the West Ben-
gal government. What all these conceptualisations 
share is their emphasis on the relations between law 
and sovereign power: the sovereign is able and legiti-
mised to suspend and/or to act outside of the law. In 
the initial stages of the revived Gorkhaland movement, 
also the GJM leaders had this capacity, as the following 
examples underline.  
Bandhs, dress-codes, and the Gorkhaland Personnel 
A first instance underlining the GJM leaders’ sover-
eignty is their ability to enforce indefinite general 
strikes (bandhs) in the Darjeeling hills. Endowed with 
the mass-support for Gorkhaland, such bandhs lay 
siege to public and private life alike. Not only were 
private and passenger vehicles or trucks prohibited 
from plying on the roads; also all government offices 
and shops, including hotels and restaurants, were 
forced to close. Only ambulances, newspaper- and 
milk-trucks, as well as vehicles of the high-file GJM 
leaders were excepted, underlining the power of these 
leaders to breach the “law” created by themselves. 
Although many respondents shared that they initially 
supported such bandhs voluntarily, later they did so 
fearing punishment and intimidation by the GJM ca-
dres. Another instance of the GJM’s sovereignty is its 
directive of a dress code forcing residents of the hill 
towns to wear “traditional Gorkha attire”. Those who 
refused got their faces blackened by GJM activists. In 
2008, the GJM even established its own police-like 
force, the Gorkhaland Personnel (initially “Gorkhaland 
Police”, GLP). This consisted of selected male and fe-
male youth who received training from former army-
personnel, got a monthly pay and stayed in barracks, 
including premises illegally occupied by the GJM. Alt-
hough officially only deployed for ensuring order dur-
ing mass protests they soon gained a reputation as 
goondas or thugs. Apparently fearing to further esca-
late the protests if deploying forces (such as happened 
in the 1980s), the CPI-M led State government was 
unable to prevent such activities. Under such condi-
tions it had to accept that it had lost its control over 
Darjeeling which now followed the extra-legal direc-
tives of the GJM leaders. 
 
Abb. 1: Female-wing GJM activists during a bandh in 
Darjeeling town, January 2011 (Foto: M. Wenner)  
Violent repression 
A second example for the GJM leaders’ sovereignty is 
their unpunished use of violence against its rivals. 
Although other regional parties in Darjeeling lack a 
broad political support base they pose a potential 
threat to the GJM by equally demanding Gorkhaland 
and exposing the GJM’s corrupt practices. In the morn-
ing of May 21, 2010, one of the most vocal critiques of 
the GJM, the popular president of the All India Gorkha 
League Madan Tamang, was physically attacked by a 
mob of GJM activists while preparing for a public 
meeting at a central place of Darjeeling town. While 
his bodyguards escaped, one GJM activist took out a 
long sword and brutally cut him under the eyes of 
police and public. Pictures of the publicly slain leader 
lying in a dark-red sea of blood were printed in the 
newspapers the next day. The main suspect escaped 
police custody under mysterious circumstances, while 
the GJM leaders figuring on the charge sheet were not 
arrested. This reminded the people of Darjeeling of 
who wielded the power, and instances a visible act of 
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their de facto sovereignty in the sense of “killing with 
impunity” (cf. Hansen & Stepputat 2006). Doubting the 
ability of the West Bengal investigating agency, in 
January 2011 the Kolkata High Court transferred the 
investigation to the national Central Bureau of Investi-
gation which since assembles evidence against the 
accused. Yet, the accused GJM leaders were not arrest-
ed till today. 
Indirect state control and “petty sovereigns” 
During the initial phase of the revived statehood agita-
tion (2007 and 2008), the GJM established its rule over 
Darjeeling drawing on massive public support. Yet, the 
regular tri-partite talks with the State and central 
governments slowly replaced the statehood agenda 
with one of regional autonomy (Indian Express, 
19.3.2010), and – although the GJM continued to 
promise statehood publicly – its inability to deliver 
Gorkhaland made people doubt the capacity and will-
ingness of the new leaders. This loss of its normative 
legitimacy threatened a loss of followers to the other 
Gorkha parties in Darjeeling and forced the GJM to 
prop up its authority with other sources (Wenner, 
2015). One of these sources was the distribution of 
developmental funds and welfare schemes along intra-
party patronage networks. Especially the monopolisa-
tion of access to the meanwhile un-elected and State-
administrator headed DGHC proved a valuable source 
of such patronage (ibid.). Accepted by government 
appointed bureaucrats, the GJM established its own 
informal (or “exceptional”) rules for the distribution of 
developmental projects. By accepting such practices, 
the state helped create the exceptional conditions for 
the GJM to act as a distributor of patronage. But while 
such paternalist networks gained importance for the 
GJM to sustain their active supporters in the district, it 
made them dependent on the West Bengal and central 
government as sources of these resources. The crea-
tion of such dependencies indicates that the state 
turned the local GJM strongmen into “petty sover-
eigns” (a term introduced by Butler (2004) to describe 
the functioning of government officials in Guantanamo 
Bay). These petty sovereigns act within a government-
created “state of exception”; although their sovereign 
power is delegated and not totally self-grounding they 
are still invested with the power to decide on life and 
death. Importantly, it is the state that creates the very 
exceptions that allow such petty sovereigns to act. The 
creation of the “state of exception” becomes a tech-
nique of governing (ibid.) an unruly space. In other 
words, by transforming the GJM strongmen into “petty 
sovereigns” by making them dependent on the recog-
nition and distribution of patronage resources through 
the state, the West Bengal government managed to 
bring them within the ambit of its own rules. These 
petty sovereigns became important mediators be-
tween the insurgent population and a state that (till 
then) was unable to rule directly. In July 2011, after 
the Trinamool Congress (TMC) had succeeded the CPI-
M in the West Bengal government, the informal work-
ing agreement between the State government and the 
GJM was formalised through the announcement of a 
new autonomous council, the Gorkhaland Territorial 
Administration (GTA) as a replacement for the DGHC. 
In August 2012, after the GJM had won the elections to 
the GTA it became the de jure distributor of the GTA’s 
resources. This institutionalised its co-dependence 
with the West Bengal State and furthered the GJM 
leaders’ transition from informal sovereigns to “petty 
sovereigns”. Also the above described Madan Tamang 
murder case indicates the ultimate dependence of the 
GJM leaders’ ability to “punish with impunity” on the 
West Bengal government. The secrecy surrounding the 
case makes it hard to tell whether the murder pre-
sents a pure act of self-grounded sovereign violence or 
whether it is the State government that created the 
“exceptions” from the law, which only enabled the act 
to take place and the accused to go unpunished. In-
deed, many in Darjeeling believe that the government 
is using the case (and related evidence) as a pawn to 
exert pressure on GJM leaders.  
Towards direct state control 
The State government was, however, not content with 
ruling at a distance through the GJM strongmen. Ra-
ther, once the GJM support base began to dwindle, it 
became more directly engaged in local party politics. 
Since 2012, backed by paramilitary forces, the TMC 
established units in Darjeeling, opening a venue to 
access those developmental resources not controlled 
by the GJM-led council. Further, its active support to 
some Gorkha sub-groups demanding tribal status by 
granting them (non-territorial) development boards 
under direct purview of the State weakened the GJM’s 
monopoly over development resources, and thus im-
pacted an importance source of their public authority. 
Spurred by these developments, other regional parties 
also began to hold public meetings. The conditions for 
such resistance against the GJM petty sovereigns are, 
however, created by the State government which uti-
lises local party political rivalries to further weaken 
the GJM and the Gorkhaland demand. 
Conclusion 
The government draws on a broad repertoire of strat-
egies for ascertaining its sovereignty in unruly spaces. 
Based on evidence from the Gorkhaland movement in 
Darjeeling, I showed how the West Bengal government 
brought local party strongmen within its governmen-
tal ambit by creating and controlling the conditions of 
a “state of exception” in the contested region. This 
became visible in the temporary suspension of law 
and order and the acceptance of informal resource 
monopolies. These exceptions created the conditions 
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for local leaders to wield power despite of challenges 
to their rule by other local actors. Ultimately, declining 
public support and these leaders’ dependence on the 
State government transformed them into “petty sov-
ereigns” lacking self-grounded sovereignty (cf. Butler 
2004).  In analysing the state-conditioned exercise of 
sovereign power by informal sovereigns, the case 
study also espoused the fuzziness of boundaries be-
tween state sovereignty and local strongmen’s control 
in the contested region. This suggests that any study of 
state sovereignty and the state of exception must pay 
adequate attention to the questions: Who creates ex-
ceptions, when, how and for how long? To whom do 
exceptions apply, are there “exceptions” from the ex-
ceptions? Why are exceptions accepted? What exactly 
counts as an exception, and how can they be recog-
nised and analysed? 
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